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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Heath Clyne appeals, contending the district court erred when it denied his
motion to amend his post conviction petition and when it summarily dismissed the
un-amended petition. Mr. Clyne claimed below that defense counsel in his underlying
criminal case was ineffective for arguing against his interests at sentencing. Mr. Clyne
also sought to supplement that claim in an amended petition. He also sought to add a
new claim - that trial counsel was ineffective for not obtaining a mental health
evaluation that fulfilled the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522, et seq., prior to sentencing.
On appeal, he contends that he should have been allowed to amend his petition
to include the new claim. He also contends that the claim regarding counsel arguing
against his interests should not have been summarily dismissed. The State responds,
contending that based on the pleadings before the district court, the district court
properly summarily dismissed the claim that counsel argued against Mr. Clyne's
interests.

It also contends that, because the claim Mr. Clyne sought to add to his

petition in his motion to amend was not a "winning" claim, the district court properly
denied the motion to amend the petition.
The State misunderstands Mr. Clyne's contention regarding the district court's
decision to not allow Mr. Clyne to amend his petition to add the new claim for relief. He
asserts on appeal, as he argued below, that his proposed amendment sought to add a
valid claim that he contends should have included in his petition and evaluated to
determine whether it presented a genuine issue of material fact.
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With regard to the claim that was actually raised before the district court
regarding counsel arguing against Mr. Clyne's interests, the problem with the State's
arguments is the incongruity of its assertion that the district court properly denied the
motion to amend the petition, which sought to amend and supplement that claim being
pursued, and its assertion that the district court also properly summarily dismissed the
petition for containing only bare and conclusory allegations which failed to establish a
genuine issue of material fact.

If the petition was not sufficient to survive summary

dismissal, then it needed to be amended and supplemented. However, if the petition
was sufficient, such that an amendment was not needed, then summary dismissal was
inappropriate. In either case, the district court's actions were erroneous and Mr. Clyne
should be afforded relief.

Therefore, this Court should vacate the judgment of

dismissal, reverse the order denying Mr. Clyne's motion for leave to amend his petition,
and remand this case for further proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Clyne's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
1.

Whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Clyne's motion
to amend his petition for post conviction relief.

2.

Whether the district court erroneously summarily dismissed Mr. Clyne's petition
for post conviction relief in the face of at least one genuine issue of material fact.
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I.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Clyne's Motion To Amend
His Petition For Post Conviction Relief
Mr. Clyne sought to amend and supplement his pro se petition in regard to
claims: (1) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek or secure a statutorilyadequate mental health evaluation prior to his initial sentencing hearing; and (2) that
trial counsel was ineffective for arguing against his interests

the sentencing hearing.

The rationales the district court gave in denying the motion to amend the petition, as
well as the arguments the
as to each of

d

A.

makes on
claims.

against

contentions, are

such, each claim will

Mr. Clyne Should Have Been Allowed To Amend His Petition Regarding His
Claim That Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Not Seeking Or Securing A
Statutorily-Adequate Mental Health Evaluation
Mr. Clyne sought to amend his petition for post conviction relief to include a new

claim - a claim alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for not seeking or securing a
statutorily-adequate mental health evaluation. (R., pp.63-66.) The district court gave
two reasons for denying the motion to amend the petition to include that claim: (1) that
claim "is being raised directly in the appeal from the Court's decision denying the Rule
35 motion," (Tr., p.22, Ls.5-7); and (2) that claim is not a "winning" claim (Tr., p.22,
Ls.4-5). 1

In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Clyne, perhaps inartfully, discussed the

Neither the district court nor the State (which subsequently argued the district court
was correct in its conclusion that this claim was not a "winning" claim) clarify how the
claim was not "winning": whether it was that the claim was not properly raised under
I.C. § 19-4901, et seq., whether it was that Mr. Clyne had failed to present sufficient
evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact on that claim, or whether it
1
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impropriety of the district court's first rationale in Section 1(8)(1) (where he argued
against the decision to deny the motion to amend his post conviction petition), and did
not address
he argued

merits of the district court's second rationale until Section ll(C) (where
the decision to summarily dismiss his petition).

However, the State's response does not address the first rationale, or any of
Mr. Clyne's arguments therein, at all. (See generally Resp. Br.) Therefore, Mr. Clyne
will not further discuss the district court's first rationale in this brief. Rather, he simply
refers this Court back to pages 11-13 of his Appellant's Brief and requests relief on that
basis.
In regard to the district court's second rationale - its belief that Mr. Clyne's claim
regarding the mental health evaluation was not a "winning claim" - the State makes
several different arguments:

(1) this Court is precluded from considering the mental

health evaluation claim, since it was not articulated in the prose petition and the district
court did not permit Mr. Clyne to amend the petition to include that claim and this Court
should affirm on the district court's second rationale because Mr. Clyne did not
challenge that rationale in his Appellant's Brief; and (2) the district court was correct in
its conclusion that the mental health evaluation claim was not a "winning" claim.

was that Mr. Clyne's allegations were somehow disproved by the record. However, a
claim purporting to assert that "trial counsel was ineffective" is properly raised under
I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. Furthermore, it is inappropriate at the summary dismissal stage
of post conviction proceedings to argue that claims should be summarily dismissed in
the face of contradictory evidence; the presence of contradictory evidence simply
demonstrates the genuine issue of material fact, and thus, the need for an evidentiary
hearing. Therefore, based on the context, Mr. Clyne believes that, by asserting that this
claim was not a "winning" claim, the district court and the State are contending that,
even if all the facts were viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Clyne, he would not
be entitled to relief, and so, failed to articulate a genuine issue of material fact on this
claim. Mr. Clyne will focus his arguments in this brief based on that understanding.
5

However, none of those arguments demonstrate that the decision to deny Mr. Clyne's
motion to amend the petition was proper. Therefore, this Court should still reverse the
decision to deny Mr. Clyne's motion to amend his petition for post conviction relief.

1.

Mr. Clyne Did Challenge The District Court's Conclusion That The Mental
Health Evaluation Claim Was Not A "Winning" Claim In His Appellant's
Brief

In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Clyne argued that the proposed amended petition
presented a genuine issue of material fact in regard to the mental health evaluation
claim, and so, the district court erred by refusing to allow him to file the amended
petition to include that claim. However, Mr. Clyne included part of his analysis on that
argument in Section 11 of his Appellant's Brief, where he also argued that the district
court erred in summarily dismissing his other claim for relief (that counsel argued
against his interests). (See App. Br., pp.15-23.) The reason Mr. Clyne argued those
two points in the same section was that he was applying the same standard of review that he had presented facts establishing a genuine issue of material fact - to both
issues. 2
The State apparently and understandably construed this to mean that Mr. Clyne
was contending that the district court erred by summarily dismissing the mental health
evaluation claim that he was seeking to add to his petition. As such, the State contends
that, since Mr. Clyne's amended petition was not accepted by the district court, the only

2

Idaho case law does not provide a clear standard for assessing whether the district
court erred in denying a motion to amend - whether, for example, the petitioner need
only show that the proposed amendment would present a viable claim for relief, or if he
must meet a higher standard and present sufficient facts to set forth a genuine issue of
material fact in the proposed amendment. In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Clyne was simply
arguing under the higher standard that might apply, since, if he meets the higher
standard, he has certainly met a lower standard.
6

claims that are viable on appeal are those that were raised in the pro se petition. (Resp.
Br., pp.15-16.) Based on that understanding of Mr. Clyne's claims, the State argues
that this Court should deny relief in regard to Mr. Clyne's mental health evaluation claim
because Mr. Clyne did not challenge the district court's second rationale for denying his
motion to amend the petition - "I think [it] is not a winning claim."

(Resp. Br., p.9

(quoting Tr., p.22, Ls.2-4).)
However, the State's argument misses the point Mr. Clyne was trying to argue,
and he apologizes for the confusion created by his Appellant's Brief in this regard. He
was arguing that, in considering whether the district court erred in refusing to allow
Mr. Clyne to amend his petition based on the fact that it sought to add a valid claim for
relief. This Court can, and indeed should, consider the merits of the proposed claim in
determining whether the district court improperly denied a motion to amend a petition. 3
However, in determining whether the district court properly summarily dismissed the
petition for post conviction relief, Mr. Clyne agrees that this Court would properly only
consider the claims actually included in the petition for relief that was before the district
court.

However, based on a proper understanding of Mr. Clyne's arguments, he did

challenge the district court's second rationale - that the mental health evaluation claim
was not a "winning" claim - in his Appellant's Brief.
Properly considering Mr. Clyne's claim on appeal, the record demonstrates that
the district court erred by refusing to allow Mr. Clyne to amend his petition. The fact that
Mr. Clyne was prevented from having a valid claim for relief considered on its merits

The State recognized as much, as it cross-applied its own arguments about whether
there was a genuine issue of material fact on this issue to its analysis of whether the
district court properly denied the motion to amend the petition because the claim was
not "winning." (See Resp. Br., p.9 n.2.)
3
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because the district court refused to allow him to amend his petition to include that
viable claim demonstrates the error of the district court's decision. After all, one of the
reasons counsel is appointed in post conviction cases is to assist the petitioner in
properly presenting all viable issue for relief. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 793
(2004 ). This is particularly true in light of the fact that a petitioner's failure to articulate
all viable claims for relief in his initial petition will most likely preclude him from ever
seeking relief on that basis in the future. See, e.g., Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35, 41
(2010) (holding that claims which could have, but were not, raised in the timely initial
petition for relief are deemed waived). Therefore, this Court should reverse the decision
to deny Mr. Clyne's motion to amend his petition.

2.

The Conclusion That The Mental Health Evaluation Claim Is Not A
"Winning" Claim Is Erroneous

As to the merits of the assertion that the claim was not "winning," the facts, when
viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Clyne, demonstrate that he would be entitled to
relief on this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 4 See, e.g., Charboneau, 140
Idaho at 793 (explaining that, at the summary dismissal stage of the proceedings, the
facts are to be viewed in the light most favorable to the petitioner). As a result, the
State's argument - that the district court properly denied the motion to amend the

As discussed in Section l(A)(1 ), supra, even though this Court cannot independently
rule on whether Mr. Clyne is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this claim without
the district court actually considering the claim first, this Court should still review the
merits of the claim - that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
trial counsel was ineffective for not seeking or securing a statutorily-adequate mental
health evaluation - as that issue is relevant to the analysis of whether the district court
abused its discretion by denying Mr. Clyne's motion to amend the petition. It is directly
relevant to the district court's determination that this was not a "winning" claim. At any
rate, as will be discussed in detail in Section l(B), infra, the courts should seek to
resolve claims on their merits, rather than on procedural defaults.
4
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petition on this issue - is meritless. The record clearly indicates that Mr. Clyne's mental
health was going to be a substantial issue at sentencing, as the district court stated, "I
need [a mental health evaluation] to sentence this defendant."

added).)

(R., p.83 (emphasis

Therefore, the district court was required to have a statutorily-adequate

evaluation of Mr. Clyne's mental condition. See, e.g., I.C. § 19-2522(1 ). As the Court of
Appeals has previously held, a defendant who is sentenced without this statutorilyrequired evaluation is entitled to a new sentencing hearing. State v. Durham, 146 Idaho
364, 367 (Ct. App. 2008). 5 Thus, the relevant facts - that the district court needed the
evaluation and sentenced Mr. Clyne without one - which appear to be unrefuted, but
certainly, if viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Clyne, demonstrate that he would
be entitled to relief.

See id.

Therefore, Mr. Clyne's allegation that his attorney was

ineffective for not ensuring the district court had this necessary information at
sentencing is a "winning" claim provided he is able to present sufficient evidence to
prove his allegations on that issue at an evidentiary hearing.
The proposed amended petition sought to assert that new claim and present
information in support thereof.

For example, it sought to present evidence that

Mr. Clyne's actions in the underlying criminal case could potentially have been
attributed to particular diagnoses, and that his condition could be managed with
medication. (R., p.65.) That evidence would demonstrate why a new evaluation was
necessary, and thus, would demonstrate why counsel needed to seek the adequate
evaluation.

Compare Durham, 146 Idaho at 367 (recognizing that one reason such

The State asserts that Durham is not relevant to this case. (Resp. Br., p.17.) As will
be demonstrated at various points herein, the analysis from that decision is relevant and
on point in several respects.
Therefore, the State's disregard of Durham is
unwarranted.
5
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evaluations are required is that they can provide information about factors relevant to
sentencing, such as whether the crime was uncharacteristic for the defendant or
factually irrational).

Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by refusing to

accept and consider this evidence relevant to a legitimate claim for post conviction
relief.
The State makes two basic arguments against this conclusion - that Mr. Clyne's
own statements at sentencing disprove his claim of ineffective assistance and that he
did not allege prejudice on this claim. (Resp. Br., pp.15-18.) Those arguments are both
erroneous.
a.

Mr. Clyne's Statements At The Sentencing Hearing Do Not
Demonstrate That His Mental Health Evaluation Claim Was Not A
"Winning" Claim

The State contends that because, at sentencing, Mr. Clyne said he did not
believe he needed mental health treatment, there is no genuine issue of material fact on
his mental health evaluation claim. (Resp. Br., pp.17-18 (quoting R., p.87).) The State
also relies on Mr. Clyne's statement at the rider review hearing regarding his
unwillingness to participate in a mental health evaluation at that time to further its
argument in this regard. (Resp. Br., p.18 (quoting Tr., p.5, Ls.9-14).) It is strange that,
in these particular instances, the State is willing to take Mr. Clyne at his word and argue
that those statements constitute sufficient evidence to disprove his allegations, and yet,
it is unwilling to accept the statements he made in his verified pleadings and affidavits
as contrary evidence which establishes a genuine issue of material fact on this claim.
(See Resp. Br., pp.10-18.)

Nevertheless, the State's arguments are misplaced; the

potentially-contradictory statements certainly do not demonstrate that there is no
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genuine issue of material fact, since all a potentially-contradictory statement can do is
create genuine issues of material fact.

However, these statements do not actually contradict or disprove Mr. Clyne's
allegations.

For example, Mr. Clyne was seeking to challenge the failure to have a

mental health evaluation conducted before the original sentencing hearing, not the rider
review hearing, in his petition for post conviction relief.

While he may have been

unwilling to participate in an evaluation at the end of a period of retained jurisdiction,
that does not necessarily mean that he was unwilling to participate in an evaluation prior
to sentencing. Therefore, his statement - that he did not want to participate in a mental
health evaluation at the end of his period of retained jurisdiction - is irrelevant to the
issue intended to be presented in his petition for post conviction relief and pursued on
this appeal.
Similarly, Mr. Clyne's statement at the sentencing hearing - that he believed he
did not need mental health treatment - even if true, does not contradict the claim he
sought to make in post conviction. As the Court of Appeals pointed out in Durham, part
of the reason the district court is required to obtain a mental health evaluation when it
determines that a defendant's mental health will be a significant factor at sentencing is
that such an evaluation "can assist the sentencing court in assessing the defendant's
capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to conform his or her
conduct to the requirements of the law at the time of the offense charged." Durham,
146 Idaho at 366 (emphasis added). It is perfectly possible that Mr. Clyne was suffering
from symptoms of a mental health condition at the time he committed the crime, but
thereafter, received treatment and medication while in jail, and so, at sentencing, no

11

longer felt the impact of those symptoms.

(See, e.g., R., pp.64-65 (noting that

Mr. Clyne had been receiving medication for schizophrenia while in jail).) In that case,
his statement would not be inaccurate, but still, would not disprove his post conviction
claim. That is certainly the case if these facts are viewed in the light most favorable to
Mr. Clyne.
Furthermore, as one author noted while examining mental health treatment in
penal facilities, "[t]here is a caveat that self-reports do not always produce an accurate
number [of people needing treatment], especially when dealing with mental illnesses.
Inmates may not even know they are suffering from an illness or they may be
embarrassed of admitting that they suffer from a mental illness. This emphasizes the
need for implementing uniform assessment and screening tools." Ralph M. Rivera, The
Mentally Ill Offender: A Brighter Tomorrow through the Eyes of the Mentally Ill Offender
Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004, 19 J.L. & Health 107, 126 (2005)
(emphasis added). If Mr. Clyne were one such person, his statement - that he did not
believe he needed treatment - would not reflect the actual state of his mental condition.
He might not have recognized that he was suffering from such a condition, or he might
have been embarrassed to admit it, and so, said that he did not have such a condition.
Neither scenario justifies trial counsel's decision to proceed to sentencing without a
statutorily-adequate evaluation.
Therefore, the State's contention that Mr. Clyne's other statements disprove his
allegation should be rejected.
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b.

Mr. Clyne Sufficiently Alleged Prejudice In Regard To His Mental
Health Evaluation Claim

The State also contends that Mr. Clyne did not allege prejudice on the proposed
mental health evaluation claim, and so, failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.

(Resp. Br., pp.15-16.)

That assertion is not accurate.

In his proposed

amended petition, Mr. Clyne contended that, had counsel sought the necessary mental
health evaluation, he would have been able to argue that Mr. Clyne could be treated in
the community, and therefore (echoing Mr. Clyne's second claim for post conviction
relief), trial counsel would not have disavowed probation as a sentencing alternative.
(R., pp.65-66.) Thus, he alleged a reasonable probability that the sentencing decision
would have been different but for trial counsel's deficient performance, and so, alleged
prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). To that point, the
State argues that, because Mr. Clyne did not provide specific information about that
treatment plan for which trial counsel would have advocated, Mr. Clyne failed to allege
sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact on the prejudice prong of
the Strickland test. (Resp. Br., pp.14-15.) That argument is also mistaken.
While it is generally expected that a petitioner will plead his case with specificity,
he cannot properly allege those things that are not within his personal knowledge as
fact. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521 (2010); Hall v. State, 156 Idaho 125, 130-31

(Ct. App. 2014). Mr. Clyne has no way of knowing what sort of treatment program the
mental health evaluator would have recommended. That deficiency is a direct result of
his trial attorney's failure to have an adequate evaluation performed. Therefore, it would
have been inappropriate for him to allege facts about the particular treatment plan for
which trial counsel could have argued in his verified pleadings or affidavits. As such,
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the perceived shortcoming that the State highlights actually proves that trial counsel's
deficient performance prejudiced Mr. Clyne.
The State's argument also demonstrates the prejudice caused by not allowing
Mr. Clyne to amend his petition and allow his trial attorney to seek and/or provide the
necessary evidence to flesh out the claim. After all, as the State noted, this claim was
not articulated in the pro se petition.

Thus, assuming post conviction counsel were

providing effective assistance in pursuing this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
upon being allowed to amend the petition, he would have requested funds from the
district court to have a mental health evaluation performed, so that he would be able to
properly articulate the actual prejudice that the State asserts is necessary. However,
Mr. Clyne was denied the opportunity to seek that evidence because the district court

refused to allow him to amend his petition to include this claim.

As such, either

Mr. Clyne has presented sufficient evidence on the prejudice prong of this proposed
claim, or else the district court's decisions denied him the meaningful opportunity to do
so. Either way, he is entitled to relief.

B.

The State's Contention That Mr. Clyne Did Not Need To Amend His Petition As
To The Claim That Trial Counsel Argued Against Mr. Clyne's Interests At
Sentencing Is Erroneously Narrow In Scope And Improperly Promotes Form
Over Substance
Mr. Clyne also tried to amend his petition to supplement his claim that his trial

attorney was ineffective because he argued against Mr. Clyne's interests at the
sentencing hearing by disavowing probation as a viable sentencing alternative in
Mr. Clyne's case. For instance, Mr. Clyne sought to allege and introduce evidence that
trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to set forth a reasonable probation plan.

14

(R., p.66.) The State responds that "[Mr.] Clyne did not, however, need to amend his
petition in order to avoid summary dismissal of his petition" on this claim because "[t]he
district court expressly invited him to respond to the state's motion [for summary
dismissal] and 'give [it] the reasons why this should be heard at an evidentiary hearing."
(Resp. Br., pp.9-10 (quoting Tr., p.25, Ls.2-5).)
That contention is erroneously narrow, as it ignores the fact that part of post
conviction counsel's job is to assist the petitioner in properly framing the issues.

See, e.g., Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793. It would do Mr. Clyne no good to reply to the
State's motion for summary dismissal if the contentions the State raised in its motion for
summary dismissal were responding to a mis-framed issue in the prose petition. In that
case, even if Mr. Clyne completely refuted all the State's contentions, his mis-framed
claim would still be subject to summary dismissal for not presenting a viable basis for
relief.
In this case, the amended petition sought to flesh out the claim in regard to the
prejudice prong of the Strickland test. (See R., p.66.) As the State argued in regard to
Mr. Clyne's mental health evaluation claim, the failure to allege prejudice means the
claim does not allege a sufficient basis for relief and should be summarily dismissed.

(See Resp. Br., pp.16-17 (citing Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 624 (2010).) As
such, it seems disingenuous for the State to turn around and argue that the district court
properly denied the request to amend the petition in regard to the claim that trial counsel
argued against Mr. Clyne's interests at sentencing, when post conviction counsel was
trying to make sure the claim adequately alleged prejudice.

15

As such, the State's

argument that Mr. Clyne could have just presented this additional information in
response to its motion for summary dismissal is erroneous and should be rejected.
Additionally, the State's argument is erroneous because it promotes form over
substance. Under the State's analysis, Mr. Clyne has to make these assertions in a
response to the State's motion rather than in an amended petition, never mind the fact
that substantive points he would be making in either case would be the same. The
Idaho Supreme Court has declared that such a result is inappropriate; "[s]ubstance not
form governs." State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355 (2003). The reason for this rule is
that "the purpose of our modern rules of pleading [is] to promote the resolution of

disputes on their merits rather than to bar suit based on antiquated pleading
requirements." Trimble v. Engelking, 130 Idaho 300, 303 (1997). To decide Mr. Clyne's
claims on their merits, the district court would need to consider the claims he raised,
which were based, in part, on the evidence he sought to present in the amended
petition. The form in which those claims and supporting evidence is presented should
not govern whether or not they are considered, and yet, that is exactly the position that
the State is advancing in this case. As a result, the State's arguments, which seek to do
exactly what the Idaho Supreme Court has declared inappropriate, should be rejected.
Furthermore, the State simply dismisses as irrelevant the fact that the district
court told Mr. Clyne's post conviction attorney, at least three times, that he would be
allowed to file an amended petition if he deemed it necessary.

(Resp. Br., p.10.)

However, those statements are not irrelevant. They speak to, and directly contradict,
the State's contention that the proper way for Mr. Clyne to raise the additional and
clarified claims was a response to the State's motion for summary dismissal.
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The

district court's statements about post conviction counsel's option to file an amended
petition demonstrate that, not only was an amended petition a viable mechanism to
present this additional information, but that it would be up to post conviction counsel
which procedural mechanism he would use to present that information. And yet, when
post conviction counsel tried to exercise his option, the district court refused to let him
do so. The fact that the district court would not consider the substance of Mr. Clyne's
information demonstrates the abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to deny
the motion to amend the petition.
Ultimately, in whatever form Mr. Clyne presented his additional information about
trial counsel's arguments against his interests, that additional information was relevant
and should have been considered by the district court in its decision to summarily
dismiss the petition. Since the district court refused to allow Mr. Clyne to present that
additional information, the district court abused its discretion by denying the motion to
amend the petition in this issue.

11.
The District Court Erroneously Summarily Dismissed Mr. Clyne's Petition For Post
Conviction Relief In The Face Of At Least One Genuine Issue Of Material Fact

A.

Mr. Clyne Presented A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact With Regard To His
Claim That His Trial Counsel Provided Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Seek
Or Secure A Mental Health Evaluation That Conformed With The Statutory
Requirements
As discussed in depth in Section l(A), supra, Mr. Clyne sought to present a valid

claim for relief based on his trial counsel's failure to seek or secure a statutorilyadequate mental health evaluation prior to his initial sentencing hearing.

In Section

ll(C) of the Appellant's Brief, Mr. Clyne was pointing out that the information he sought
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to add with this additional claim for relief did present a genuine issue of material fact,
and so, he should have been allowed to amend his petition to include that claim.
However, he recognizes that such an argument is more properly addressed in Section l,
and so, in this Brief, he has presented that analysis fully in Section I. He apologizes for
any confusion his structuring of the argument may have caused.

B.

Mr. Clyne Presented A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact With Regard To His
Claim That His Trial Counsel Provided Ineffective Assistance By Arguing Against
Mr. Clyne's Interests At The Sentencing Hearing
Mr. Clyne contends that his trial attorney was ineffective because he argued

against Mr. Clyne's interests by disavowing probation as a viable sentencing option,
even though the plea agreement called for the State to recommend probation. To that
end, Mr. Clyne contends that, had trial counsel effectively argued on his behalf, trial
counsel would have presented a reasonable plan for probation, including a provision for
mental health treatment in the community. The State responds that, because Mr. Clyne
did not fully explain what that proposed plan for receiving treatment in the community
would be in his pleadings, he failed to present sufficient evidence to show that trial
counsel performed deficiently by disavowing the possibility that Mr. Clyne would be
successful on probation. (Resp. Br., pp.13-14.)
The State's argument misses the whole point of Mr. Clyne's claim. The claim at
issue here is that, by arguing against the very sentencing alternative for which Mr. Clyne
had negotiated in his plea agreement, trial counsel failed to be a zealous advocate for
Mr. Clyne. (App. Br., p.17; see R., p.66.)

Attorneys have a fundamental duty to be a

loyal, zealous advocate for their clients. Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232, 238 (2008).
As the United States Supreme Court has pointed out, this is "perhaps the most basic of
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counsel's duties." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984 ). Thus, where a
petitioner sets forth facts that would, if viewed in the light most favorable to him, show
that counsel was not a zealous advocate on his behalf and that counsel's failure to be a
zealous advocate prejudiced him (as Mr. Clyne has done here), he would be entitled to
relief. This is true regardless of how specific trial counsel's arguments to the district
court were; the fact that his trial counsel disavowed probation as a sentencing option in
the face of the plea agreement calling for a suspended sentence demonstrates that he
was not acting as a zealous advocate on Mr. Clyne's behalf. Therefore, Mr. Clyne had
alleged facts establishing that trial counsel's performance was deficient
The State also points to the fact that, in the midst of his statements about how
Mr. Clyne was not an appropriate candidate for probation, trial counsel submitted a
letter indicating that Mr. Clyne had been accepted into the Rising Sun Sober Living
House.

(Resp. Br., p.14 (citing R., p.85).)

Based on the fact that trial counsel

presented this piece of evidence, the State contends that trial counsel's sentencing
argument was somehow acceptable.

(Resp. Br., p.14.) However, the fact that trial

counsel presented that single piece of evidence does not demonstrate that trial counsel
was an effective, zealous advocate for Mr. Clyne at the sentencing hearing.

Even

though that piece of evidence demonstrates that Mr. Clyne had been accepted into a
treatment program, he still had to convince the district court that the program would
serve the sentencing objectives.

As such, trial counsel's assertion - that Mr. Clyne

could participate in that program but would not be successful on probation anyway argued that, even if he participated in that program, he would be unlikely to adequately
rehabilitate or conform his actions to society's expectations. As a result, trial counsel

19

was still arguing against Mr. Clyne's interests, which constitutes deficient performance
by counsel.
In regard to the second prong of the Strickland test, the State maintains that,
because Mr. Clyne had not established what specific probation plan trial counsel could
have argued, there was not sufficient evidence to establish that counsel's sentencing
arguments prejudiced Mr. Clyne. (R., p.15.) However, as discussed in Section l(B),
supra, it would have been improper for Mr. Clyne to have alleged such facts, as they

were not in his personal knowledge. At any rate, to show prejudice under Strickland,
the petitioner must only show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient
performance, the result might have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. It is
difficult to see how there is not a reasonable probability that Mr. Clyne's sentence would
have been different if trial counsel had not argued against probation as a viable
sentencing option.

The prosecutor obviously thought there was a possibility that

Mr. Clyne would be successful on probation, since the prosecutor entered an
agreement to, and ultimately did, recommend probation. As such, there is a reasonable
probability that, had Mr. Clyne's trial attorney not undermined that recommendation, the

district court would have suspended Mr. Clyne's sentence.

Thus, there is sufficient

evidence that trial counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Mr. Clyne.
summary dismissal of the petition was inappropriate.
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Therefore,

CONCLUSION
Mr. Clyne respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment summarily
dismissing his petition, reverse the order denying his motion to amend his petition for
post conviction relief, and remand this case for further proceedings.
th

DATED this 20 day of January, 2015.
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